American Express, Goldman Sachs, and Eli Lilly: Sector Divergence on February 23, 2026

American Express: Consumer Credit Bifurcation Accelerates

American Express shares plunged 7% in a session that laid bare the emerging consumer credit deterioration across the premium cardholder segment. [1][2] The sell-off was driven by a constellation of negative signals that collectively undermined the “affluent consumer resilience” narrative that had supported AmEx’s premium valuation through 2025.

Fourth-quarter earnings per share came in at $3.53, missing Wall Street’s $3.54 consensus by a penny — a narrow miss in absolute terms, but symbolically devastating for a company that had consistently beaten estimates. Revenue rose 10% year-over-year to $18.98 billion, demonstrating top-line strength that failed to translate into bottom-line confidence. [1]

The most alarming data point was credit loss provisions, which climbed to $1.4 billion from $1.3 billion in the prior quarter. The net write-off rate rose to 2.1%, up from 1.9% — a 10.5% sequential deterioration in credit quality that suggests the delinquency uptick is accelerating rather than stabilizing. [1][2] Operating expenses surged 10% to $14.5 billion, further compressing margins.

The 10% Interest Rate Cap: Regulatory Pressure Compounds Credit Risk

Compounding the credit quality deterioration, National Economic Council communications during the week referenced the possibility of a federally mandated 10% interest rate cap on consumer credit products. [3] For American Express, which derives significant revenue from its premium-tier credit products carrying annual percentage rates well above 10%, this represents a direct attack on the company’s most profitable revenue stream.

The dual pressure of rising credit losses from below (consumer delinquencies) and margin compression from above (regulatory rate caps) creates a scissors effect on AmEx’s earnings power. The market’s 7% repricing reflects the recognition that premium consumer credit — long considered the safest corner of consumer finance — is not immune to the broader macroeconomic stress created by the Section 122 tariff regime.

Goldman Sachs: The Apple Card Exit Calculus

Goldman Sachs declined 3.69% as the market processed the latest developments in the bank’s long-delayed exit from the Apple Card partnership. After years of losses in its consumer banking push, Goldman formally transitioned the Apple Card portfolio to JPMorgan Chase in a deal that reveals the true cost of its consumer finance experiment. [4][5]

The headline number: Goldman Sachs marked down the Apple Card portfolio by $2.26 billion, with an additional $38 million in transition costs. [4] However, the exit also allowed Goldman to release $2.48 billion in loan loss reserves that were tied up against the consumer portfolio, generating an estimated $0.46 EPS accretion to fourth-quarter results. [5]

The net effect is a wash on paper, but the strategic implications are profound. Goldman’s consumer banking retreat — including the Apple Card, Marcus savings, and GreenSky — represents the most expensive strategic U-turn in modern bulge-bracket banking. JPMorgan, with its 70-million-strong consumer base and established credit card infrastructure, inherits a portfolio that it can service far more efficiently than Goldman ever could.

Goldman’s Identity Reset: Back to Institutional Roots

Where Goldman’s institutional franchise shone was in its trading divisions. Equities revenue surged 25% year-over-year to $4.31 billion, driven by the volatility environment that punished consumer-facing firms. FICC rose 12% to $3.11 billion. Investment banking fees jumped 25% to $2.58 billion as the M&A and IPO pipeline that had been frozen through 2024 began to thaw. [5][6]

The Apple Card exit costs ($2.26 billion markdown + $38M transition) were largely offset by the $2.48 billion reserve release. But the 24-month sunset timeline for the full portfolio transition means Goldman will remain entangled with consumer credit risk through 2028 — a drag on what is otherwise a clean return to the institutional model that built the firm’s franchise.

Financial sector pressure from Goldman and AmEx compounded the tariff-driven macro sell-off in the Section 122 trade shock and the AI software commoditization panic, making financials the worst-performing S&P 500 sector on February 23.

Eli Lilly’s Zepbound KwikPen: Healthcare Pricing Disruption

In sharp contrast to the financial carnage, Eli Lilly’s Zepbound division provided a rare example of defensive resilience and strategic pricing innovation during the session. The launch of the Zepbound KwikPen — a multidose format delivering four weekly doses per unit — at a starting price of $299 per month through the LillyDirect platform represents the most aggressive disintermediation play in pharmaceutical history. [7][8]

The pricing is strategic on multiple levels. At $299 starting and $449 maximum through LillyDirect, down $50 from the previous single-dose pricing, Lilly is underpricing the pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) channel to drive patients directly to its own distribution network. This bypass of the traditional PBM/insurer/pharmacy supply chain eliminates middleman markups and positions Lilly to capture the full economic value of each prescription. [7]

IQVIA data confirms Zepbound as the #1 prescribed injectable obesity medication in the United States by new prescription volume. [8] The multidose KwikPen format reduces per-dose costs, improves patient compliance via fewer injection events, and creates a switching cost advantage over Novo Nordisk’s Wegovy that extends beyond mere pricing.

Why Healthcare Held While Finance Crumbled

The divergence between healthcare resilience and financial sector fragility reflects the market’s assessment of which business models can withstand the stagflationary pressures introduced by the Section 122 tariff regime. Healthcare demand is inelastic: patients need obesity medications regardless of tariff rates. Consumer credit, by contrast, deteriorates precisely when macro conditions worsen.

This sectoral divergence — financials as the worst-performing sector, healthcare as a relative safe haven — may define portfolio rotation through the first half of 2026. Investors seeking defensive positioning may increasingly allocate toward pharmaceutical innovators with pricing power and direct distribution channels, moving away from financial stocks exposed to consumer credit risk and regulatory rate cap threats.

The commodity signal from surging oil and divergent metals markets reinforces this rotation thesis: inflationary pressures favor companies with pricing power (Eli Lilly) and punish those with margin compression risk (American Express).